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Abstract—We propose a path guidance system with a user-
based charge and subsidy (UBCS) scheme for single O-D
network mobility management. Users who are willing to join the
scheme (subscribers) can submit travel requests along with their
VOTs to the system before traveling. Those who are not willing
to join (outsiders) only need to submit travel requests to the
system. Our system will give all users path guidance from their
origins to their destinations, and collect a path payment from the
UBCS subscribers. Subscribers will be charged or subsided in a
way that renders the UBCS strategy-proof, revenue-neutral, and
Pareto-improving. A numerical example shows that the UBCS
scheme is equitable and progressive.
Index Terms—charge and subsidy, path payment, network
mobility management, system optimal, value of time, strategy-
proof, Pareto improvement, revenue-neutral
I. INTRODUCTION
Congestion pricing has been theoretically demonstrated
to be an effective way of relieving traffic congestion in
many pieces of literature since the pioneering work of [1].
Comprehensive reviews can be found in [2]–[5]. The classical
approach to modeling the problem is to seek a tolling strategy
under which a user equilibrium (UE) traffic assignment is
the same as a system optimized (SO) assignment. Although
congestion tolls work effectively in ideal situations, it faces
both technical and political difficulties in the real world.
Technically, according to almost all related studies, designing
an optimal tolling strategy usually requires the authority to
know about accurate and detailed demand information (OD
demand matrix, value of time (VOT) distributions) [6]. How-
ever, due to the asymmetric information that exists between
road managers and the users, it is almost impossible for the
road managers to obtain that private information in the tolling
framework. Politically, being enforced to pay for what was
originally free makes the travelers regard the toll as a lump-
sum tax and hence are resistant to the pricing policies. Equity
impact is another important political issue. Congestion pricing
has been believed to harm the poor people because they need
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to pay more due to inflexible schedules or are forced to switch
to less desirable routes, transportation modes, or departure
times [7].
To deal with the technical issue about asymmetric infor-
mation, some trial-and-error implementation methods have
been proposed for a single road with unknown demand func-
tions [8] (improved in [9]), general network with unknown
demand functions [10], and general network with unknown
demand & cost functions [11]. They tried to show that
even with incomplete information, the proposed trial-and-
error methods utilizing observable link flows can make the
UE state converge to the SO state [8]–[10], or at least will
lead to a general convergence [11]. These methodologies,
however, all assumed homogeneous travelers to simplify the
modeling. Heterogeneous VOTs of individual travelers, which
is a critical factor that influences their route choice and mode
choice, are ignored. Hence the performance of these trial-
and-error methods is still unknown in the real world where
we surely have heterogeneous travelers.
To deal with the political issues, the toll and subsidy
(T&S) schemes were designed to relieve public resistance
and improve social equity. There include two types of T&S
schemes: the indirect two-stage schemes and the direct one-
stage scheme. In the indirect two-stage schemes, the travelers
are first charged nonnegative tolls for using the roads, and all
the collected tolls are then redistributed to travelers in equal or
unequal manners [12]–[15]. This makes the schemes revenue-
neutral since it eliminates the financial transfer between the
government and the travelers. In the direct one-stage scheme,
the users are charged either positive tolls or negative tolls
(subsidies) for using the roads or transportation modes [16]–
[21]. Usually, the sum of charges is equal to the sum of
subsidies so that the schemes remain the revenue-neutral
property. Apart from the objective of reaching SO under UE,
the Pareto-improvement of the users’ benefits has attracted
significant attention when designing the T&S scheme [14],
[19], [20]. A Pareto-improving scheme is a scheme that im-
proves some travelers’ benefits without sacrificing any others’
benefits compared with the UE with no policy intervention. It
is expected that if all travelers can benefit from the scheme (or
at least some can benefit while others remain the same), the
scheme will gain more public support. Efforts have shown
that even if the Pareto-improvement is achieved, the T&S
schemes are usually regressive (benefit high-income travelers
more than low-income travelers) [22]. Hence they will widen
the gap between the rich and poor.
In addition to the T&S schemes, the tradable credit
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
08
76
6v
1 
 [e
es
s.S
Y]
  1
5 J
un
 20
20
schemes (TCS) have also been reputed to be an effective way
to manage congestion in a revenue-neutral manner. In a TCS,
credits are periodically (e.g., weekly, monthly) distributed by
the authority to road users, and users are then required to pay
a certain number of credits for using the links. Credits are
universal within the network, while the credit charged may
vary link by link. Credits can be traded among travelers so that
people with extra credits can sell their credits to people with
insufficient credits. The credit prices are determined through
free trading. The TCS idea can be traced back to Dales’s work
in 1968 for water quality management [23]. The concepts
were then extended for vehicle emission control [24] and
traffic management [25]. A milestone was established in 2011
when [26] made rigorous quantitative modeling and analysis
of the TCS for network mobility management. Following
that, different efforts have been made to study the TCS
from various aspects. A recent detailed review of TCS-related
research can be found in [27].
The most straightforward advantage of TCS over direct
congestion pricing is its revenue-neutral property, which helps
reduce public skepticism. It has also been demonstrated that
an O-D specific distribution of the initial credits can make
the TCS Pareto-improving considering homogeneous travelers
[26]. Researches considering travelers’ different income levels
have found that TCS can be more equitable and progressive
(benefit low-income travelers more than high-income travel-
ers) than congestion pricing [22]. Despite those improvements
in political aspects, the technical issue when it comes to
implementation in practice is by no means well solved. The
TCS still needs specific O-D demand and individual VOT
information. Similar to congestion pricing, the trial-and-error
methods have also been proposed to implement the TCS
with unknown demand functions for both single road [9] and
general network [28]. VOT was assumed to be homogeneous
and known in these studies. No effective implementation
strategies for TCS have been developed for a more realistic
case with unknown heterogeneous VOTs.
As an alternative to congestion pricing and TCS, there
exist other kinds of economic instruments that seek to reduce
traffic congestion and remove the asymmetric information
issue. One example is the tradable network permits (TNP)
proposed in [29]. In TNP, an operator issues time-dependent
permits for each link, and only the permit holder has the
right to use a pre-specified link at a pre-specified time. The
operator can eliminate congestion by ensuring that the number
of issued permits does not exceed the capacity of each link.
Therefore, link travel times are assumed to be constant due to
the absence of congestion. Hence users will be able to arrive
at their purchased link on time. Permits can be distributed
in a market selling scheme or a free distribution scheme. In
a market selling scheme, travelers need to buy permits from
the operator, which deviates the TNP from revenue-neutral.
In a free distribution scheme, permits are freely distributed
among travelers. Travelers can trade the permits in a permit
market when their holding permits do not match their travel
demands. According to the demonstration in [29], [30], the
TNP theoretically only requires the operator to know the
capacity information of each link for determining the number
of issued permits, and there is no need to know any demand
information.
In summary, pure congestion pricing is not revenue-neutral
or equitable, although it can be Pareto-improving in certain
special networks [31]–[33]. T&S scheme is revenue-neutral,
can be Pareto-improving in some cases, but it is hard to be
equitable. TCS is revenue-neutral, can be Pareto-improving
in some cases, and it is more equitable than pricing and
T&S scheme. All of the three aforementioned schemes require
detailed demand information (even with existing trial-and-
error methods, the detailed VOT information is still needed),
which makes their performance unknown in the real world
with heterogeneous travelers. Even if we assume that the
operators have access to ask travelers about their VOTs,
no existing strategies ensure that the travelers will trustfully
report their VOTs. In other words, the strategy-proofness of
all these schemes is unknown. TNP is usually not revenue-
neutral or equitable; its Pareto-improving property is un-
known. However, it is more practical in the sense that no
demand information is required. Moreover, it is proved to be
strategy-proof under a properly designed agent-based auction
mechanism [6].
In light of the research gap and the inspirations from the
literature, we propose a path guidance system with a user-
based charge and subsidy (UBCS) scheme for single O-D
network mobility management. Users who are willing to join
the scheme (subscribers) can submit travel requests along
with their VOTs to the system before traveling. Those who
are not willing to join (outsiders) only need to submit travel
requests to the system. Our system will give all users path
guidance from their origins to their destinations, and collect
a path payment (can be either positive or negative) from the
UBCS subscribers. Subscribers will be charged or subsided in
a way that renders the UBCS scheme strategy-proof, revenue-
neutral, and Pareto-improving. Our numerical example also
shows that the UBCS scheme is equitable and progressive,
which means it benefits the poor more than the rich.
II. METHODOLOGY
We assume a single O-D with fixed demand in this paper.
Our approach consists of four steps, which we describe next.
Step 1: Link flow determination: Our optimal link flow
vector, q∗ = {q∗a}, is one that solves a classical single O-D
SO problem, which (for the sake of completeness) is given
as
Minimize
∑
a∈A
qata(qa) (1)
s.t.
∑
r∈R
δa,rfr = qa, a ∈ A (2)∑
r∈R
fr = d (3)
fr ≥ 0, r ∈ R. (4)
Here δa,r = 1 if path r uses link a, and 0 otherwise, d is fixed
travel demand, ta(·) is a travel time function associated with
link a (assumed to be a non-negative, convex, differentiable
and monotonically increasing function with link volume) and
fr is the flow on path r. Since the objective function and
constraints for the above SO problem are convex, the optimal
link flow vector q∗ is unique, while the optimal path flow
vector f∗ = {f∗r } is not necessarily unique.
Step 2: Path flow determination: For the UBCS sub-
scribers, we consider continuously distributed VOTs with
bounded support and denote the individual VOT by β. We
denote by d˜ the portion of d that corresponds to subscribers.
We then divide the support of the VOT distribution into M
intervals of equal length ∆β. Let d˜m denote the number of
subscribers whose VOTs are within the mth interval, βm the
average VOT of all d˜m users within the mth interval, and
f˜mr the flow of subscribers on path r with VOTs within the
mth interval. The cost-minimizing path flows corresponding
to subscribers can be determined by producing a distribution
of subscriber demands to routes based on their VOT (weighted
by VOT), but preserving SO flows. Constraint (6) below as-
signs the link flow to subscribers in proportion to their volume
so that resources are fairly distributed among subscribers and
outsiders.
Minimize
M∑
m=1
∑
r∈R
βmf˜mr Tr (5)
s.t.
M∑
m=1
∑
r∈R
δa,rf˜
m
r = q
∗
a
d˜
d
, a ∈ A (6)∑
r∈R
f˜mr = d˜
m, m = 1, . . . ,M (7)
f˜mr ≥ 0, r ∈ R. (8)
Here Tr is the travel time of path r calculated as
Tr =
∑
a∈A
δa,rta(q
∗
a). (9)
Let fˆr denote the flow of outsiders on path r, and dˆ = d− d˜
the outsiders’ demand. Based on q∗ (in the first step) and
the payment path flow vector f˜m∗ = {f˜m∗r }r∈R (the second
step), it can be readily verified that the path flow of outsiders
is given by
fˆ∗r =
M∑
m=1
dˆ
d˜
f˜m∗r . (10)
Step 3: Individual user assignment: Let (r(1), · · · , r(|R|))
be a rearrangement of path set R so that Tr(1) ≥ · · · ≥
Tr(i−1) ≥ Tr(i) ≥ · · · ≥ Tr(|R|) , and with slight abuse of
notation we define a corresponding partition of the support of
the VOT distribution inf β = β0 ≤ β1 ≤ . . . ≤ β|R| = supβ,
where1 ∫ βi
β0
p(b)db =
1
d˜
i∑
j=1
f˜∗r(j) , (11)
1The partition points {βi} differ from the discrete VOTs {βm} in step 2.
where p is probability density function of VOT β. Each
interval (βi−1, βi] gives the lower and upper bound VOT asso-
ciated with path r(i) with travel time Tr(i) . Hence subscribers
with VOT β ∈ (βi−1, βi] will be assigned to path r(i). We
denote by ρi the likelihood that an outsider is assigned to
route r(i), which is given by
ρi =
f˜∗r(i)
d˜
=
fˆ∗r(i)
dˆ
. (12)
Step 4: Subscribers’ payment determination: We use
the following equation to determine the UBCS subscribers’
payment on each path r(i), i = 1, . . . , |R|:
Pi =
i−1∑
h=1
ρh
i∑
g=h+1
(Tr(g−1) − Tr(g))βg−1−
|R|∑
h=i+1
ρh
h∑
g=i+1
(Tr(g−1) − Tr(g))βg−1. (13)
According to (13), subscribers on the same path r(i) make
the same payment, even if they have different VOTs.
Theorem 1. The payment determined by (13) is the unique
strategy that is both strategy-proof and revenue-neutral.
Proof. Assume that ∃β ∈ (βi−1, βi] in path i ∈ R+, and
∃β′ ∈ (βj−1, βj ] in path j ∈ R+. Without loss of generality,
we just make β < β′ here.
1) In the case of i = j
If β is the true VOT and β′ is the declared one, a strategy-
proof mechanism should require additional cost brought by
lying to be non-negative:
C(β′|β)− C(β|β) = Tr(j)β + Pβ′,j − Tr(i)β − Pβ,i
i=j
= Pβ′,i − Pβ,i ≥ 0. (14)
Where Pβ,i is payment of the user with declared VOT β (in
path i). C represents the cost. If β′ is the true VOT and β is
the declared one, we have
C(β|β′)− C(β′|β′) = Tr(i)β′ + Pβ,i − Tr(j)β′ − Pβ′,j
i=j
= Pβ,i − Pβ′,i ≥ 0. (15)
Based on inequalities (14) and (15), we have Pβ,i = Pβ′,i.
It means that, the payment for subscribers with different
VOTs on the same path should be the same. For simplifi-
cation, we use Pi to represent the payment on path i in the
following content.
2) In the case of i 6= j
Since β < β′, we have i < j, hence Tr(i) ≥ Tr(j) . Similar
to constraints (14) and (15),we have
Pj − Pi ≥ (Tr(i) − Tr(j))βi. (16)
Pj − Pi ≤ (Tr(i) − Tr(j))βj−1. (17)
Based on (16) and (17), we can have a unique solution:
Pj − Pi =
j−i∑
k=1
(Tr(i+k−1) − Tr(i+k))βi+k−1. (18)
To make the mechanism revenue neutral, we need one more
equation:
|R|∑
i=1
ρiPi = 0, (19)
Solving the equations yields the unique solution Pi (i =
1, · · · , |R+|):
Pi =
i−1∑
h=1
ρh
i∑
g=h+1
(Tr(g−1) − Tr(g))βg−1−
|R|∑
h=i+1
ρh
h∑
g=i+1
(Tr(g−1) − Tr(g))βg−1. (20)
This completes the proof. 
Theorem 1 states that the UBSC scheme is unique, and
that under the UBSC scheme no subscribers are incentivized
to report untruthful VOTs (or keep their VOT information pri-
vate). Note that VOT is collected before each trip, hence one
person may have different VOTs in different trips, depending
on the trip purpose and other circumstances. Travelers are
responsible for evaluating their specific VOT in each trip,
and the UBCS scheme will motivate them to report the true
evaluated VOT. Meanwhile, the UBCS scheme is revenue
neutral: the total payments made are equal to the subsidies
made in the system.
It is worth noting that, we do not explicitly introduce a
path-differentiated payment, it is rather natural outcome of
our strategy-proof approach. This fundamentally differs from
path-differentiated pricing in the literature which explicitly
employ a unique toll for each path [34], [35]. However,
since our model produces a path-differentiated payment as
output, the research on how to efficiently implement path
tolls using automated vehicle identification sensors given a
path toll scheme [36] can be also used when implementing
our UBCS in the real world.
Theorem 2. Joining the UBCS scheme is Pareto-improving
compared with either quitting the UBCS scheme or being in
the UE without any policy intervention.
Proof. Suppose there is a user with VOT β ∈ (βi−1, βi]. If
he/she is a UBCS joiner, we can calculate his/her cost C(β)
as
C(β) = Tr(i)β + Pi. (21)
If he/she is a UBCS quitter, we can calculate his/her cost
CQ(β) as
CQ(β) =
|R|∑
h=1
ρhTr(h)β. (22)
If no policy is implemented, under the UE condition, his/her
cost CUE can be calculated as
CUE(β) = TUEβ, (23)
where TUE is the universal travel time for all users under
UE.
Combining Equations (20) to (22) and
∑|R|
h=1 ρh = 1, we
have
CQ(β)− C(β) = −
i−1∑
h=1
ρh
i∑
g=h+1
(Tr(g−1) − Tr(g))βg−1+
|R|∑
h=1
ρhTr(h)β−Tr(i)β+
|R|∑
h=i+1
ρh
h∑
g=i+1
(Tr(g−1) −Tr(g))βg−1
=
i−1∑
h=1
ρh(Tr(h)−Tr(i))β−
i−1∑
h=1
ρh
i∑
g=h+1
(Tr(g−1)−Tr(g))βg−1+
|R|∑
h=i+1
ρh(Tr(h)−Tr(i))β+
|R|∑
h=i+1
ρh
h∑
g=i+1
(Tr(g−1)−Tr(g))βg−1
=
i−1∑
h=1
ρh[(Tr(h) − Tr(i))β −
i∑
g=h+1
(Tr(g−1) − Tr(g))βg−1]+
|R|∑
h=i+1
ρh[(Tr(h) − Tr(i))β +
h∑
g=i+1
(Tr(g−1) − Tr(g))βg−1].
(24)
For any 1 ≤ h ≤ i − 1, there are βh ≤ · · · ≤ βi−1 ≤ β,
and Tr(h) ≥ Tr(i) :
(Tr(h) − Tr(i))β −
i∑
g=h+1
(Tr(g−1) − Tr(g))βg−1 ≥
(Tr(h) − Tr(i))β − βi−1
i∑
g=h+1
(Tr(g−1) − Tr(g)) =
(Tr(h) − Tr(i))(β − βi−1) ≥ 0 (25)
For any i + 1 ≤ h ≤ |R|, there are β ≤ βi ≤ · · · ≤ βh,
and Ti ≥ Th:
(Tr(h) − Tr(i))β +
h∑
g=i+1
(Tr(g−1) − Tr(g))βg−1 ≥
(Tr(h) − Tr(i))β + βi
h∑
g=i+1
(Tr(g−1) − Tr(g)) =
(Tr(i) − Tr(h))(βi − β) ≥ 0 (26)
Therefore, CQ(β)−C(β) ≥ 0. Hence joining the UBCS is
Pareto-improving compared with quitting it for all users with
different VOTs.
Combining (22) and (23), we have
CUE(β)− CQ(β) = β(TUE −
|R|∑
h=1
ρhTr(h)) (27)
Since Th is based on the time-based SO link flow solution from
the first step, we can find that the expected travel time of the
quitters is no longer than the UE travel time, which means
TUE ≥
∑|R+|
h=1 ρhTh. Hence CUE(β) ≥ CQ(β) ≥ C(β),
meaning that joining the UBCS scheme is Pareto-improving
compared with UE without any policy intervention.
This completes the proof. 
According to Theorem 2, the guidance system is attractive
to current users since joining the system (either being a
subscriber or an outsider) will reduce their travel costs in
expectation. While in the system, joining the UBCS scheme
would be attractive to users since it will further reduce their
expected costs. Such Pareto-improvement property makes the
UBCS scheme active without forcing anyone to join it.
III. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Consider the small network in Fig. 1; the number inside
the bracket is the link number, and the function beside it is
the link travel time (min) function of the link flow. Note that
the linearly increasing functions are used here for simplicity,
more complicated and practical functions can be used in real
world application. The OD demand from A to C is 1000. We
assume 800 users are UBCS subscribers, and the remaining
200 are outsiders. The PDF of VOT for the subscribers is
assumed to be triangular as shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 1: Network structure
Fig. 2: VOT distribution
TABLE I: Link flows under UE and SO
Link (1) (2) (3) (4)
UE flow 214 786 567 433
UE time (min) 20.7 20.7 19.3 19.3
SO flow 250 750 450 550
SO time (min) 22.5 20 17 20.5
The link flows from UE and SO are shown in TABLE
I. Average travel time in UE and SO is 40.1 min and 39.6
min, respectively. Through UBCS, we can guide users to
use allocated paths, and make corresponding payments. The
TABLE II: Results for UBCS subscribers and outsiders
Path (1) + (3) (1) + (4) (2) + (3) (2) + (4)
Time (min) 39.5 43 37 40.5
Subscribers 0 200 360 240
Outsiders 0 50 90 60
VOT ($/h) - (5.0, 17.2] (31.6, 45.0] (17.2, 31.6]
Payment ($) - −1.37 1.19 −0.65
0 10 40 50
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5%
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20%
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Fig. 3: Improvement of UBCS compared with the UE with
no policy intervention.
optimal travel times for all paths, subscriber and outsider
path flows, the VOT bounds, and payments for each path are
shown in TABLE II. According to the UBCS scheme, 360
subscribers with highest VOTs are guided to the fastest path
with travel time of 37 min. Each of them will be charged
$1.19. 240 Subscribers with middle VOTs are guided to the
path with travel time of 40.5 min, and each of them will
receive a subsidy of $0.65. The rest subscribers with lowest
VOTs are guided to the path with longest travel time of 43
min, and will receive a subsidy of $1.37.
We also show the percent improvement to UBCS outsiders
and subscribers compared with UE conditions without any
policy intervention. Fig. 3 shows the result for users with
different VOTs. We find that subscribers with low VOT (6
$18/h) benefit the most from joining the UBCS scheme, which
is much higher than the subscribers with mid-to-high VOTs.
Subscribers with the lowest VOTs can enjoy improvements
as high as 34%. This demonstrates that our UBCS scheme is
equitable and progressive, meaning it benefits the poor more
than the rich. Besides, outsiders can also benefit from the
system compared with UE, while the improvement percentage
remains the same for all outsiders with different VOTs.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on a single O-D network with fixed demand, we
proposed a path guidance system with a user-based charge
and subsidy (UBCS) scheme for network traffic management.
In our system, users need to submit their travel request to road
operators in advance. Moreover, if they are UBCS subscribers,
they also need to report their VOT to operators. The system
optimizes all requests and then returns path guidance to each
user. A charge or subsidy will be made to the user based
on their allocated path. We theoretically proved that the
UBCS is strategy-proof (encourages the subscribers to report
their VOTs truthfully), Pareto-improving (no one is worse
off compared with the UE with no policy intervention), and
revenue-neutral. Our numerical example shows that the UBCS
is also equitable and progressive. It can help reduce the gap
between poor and rich, implying it is more likely to gain
public support. The essence of the UBCS scheme is the win-
win utility transfer between different users so that all users
can benefit from the scheme. Similar ideas have also been
employed in the lane change scenario [37], [38] and single
intersection control scenario [39], [40] in our earlier work.
Future studies can include multi O-D analysis and elastic
demand scenarios.
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